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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 






 Vocknal Paul, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of an order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from the decision of an immigration 
judge (IJ) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under 
the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 
petition for review. 
 In July 2019, Paul, a citizen of Haiti, was placed in removal proceedings for being 
present without admission or parole, and as an applicant for admission who lacked a valid 
entry document.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).  Paul admitted 
the allegations; conceded removability; and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, 
and CAT relief.  
 The IJ denied all relief after a hearing at which Paul testified about the loss of his 
parents in the devastating earthquake of 2010 and his other experiences, including an 
attack in which he was stabbed and robbed as a homeless youth on the streets of Haiti.  
Although the IJ found Paul’s testimony credible, he ruled that Paul was not entitled to 
asylum or withholding of removal because the group “Haitian homeless” did not meet the 
particularity requirement for a social group because it was “vast, diffuse, and 
amorphous.”  (IJ Op. at 7).  The IJ explained that such a group “would encompass 
individuals of any gender, any age and persons from varying backgrounds in Haiti and 




could be homeless as a result of economic circumstances, illness or fractured family ties.”  
(Id.).1  The IJ also ruled that the experiences Paul described did not constitute torture 
under the CAT standard. 
The BIA summarily affirmed and dismissed the appeal.  Paul filed a timely 
petition for review to this Court.2 
We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA pursuant to 8 U.S.C.           
§ 1252.  “If the BIA summarily affirms an IJ’s order, we review the IJ’s decision as the 
final administrative determination.”  En Hui Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  We review the agency’s findings of fact for substantial 
evidence, considering whether it is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative 
evidence on the record considered as a whole.”  Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 
161 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The decision must be 
affirmed “unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  
Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
 
1 The IJ also ruled that even if “Haitian homeless” constituted a cognizable social group, 
Paul had failed to establish a nexus between membership in that group and the harm he 
suffered, or the harm that he fears suffering upon his return to Haiti. 
 
2 The Government argues that Paul failed to challenge the IJ’s ruling regarding the 
particularity requirement for a social group in his appeal to the BIA and in this appeal, 
and thus that this issue is unexhausted and forfeited.  However, based on our review of 
Paul’s briefs, we conclude that he indeed raised this issue both before the BIA and in this 




To make out a prima facie case for asylum, Paul must show that he was 
persecuted, or has a well-founded fear of persecution, “on account” of a statutorily 
protected ground, including “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13.  Paul sought 
asylum on the basis of his membership in the purported particular social group of 
“Haitian homeless.”  To be cognizable, a particular social group must be “‘(1) composed 
of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, 
and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.’”  S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 
535, 540 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014)).3  
The IJ did not err in holding that the group Haitian homeless did not meet the 
particularity requirement to be a cognizable social group because it was vast, diffuse, and 
amorphous.  See S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 552 (explaining that “particularity” standard 
requires the group to have “discrete and definable boundaries that are not amorphous, 
overbroad, diffuse, or subjective”) (quotation marks and alteration omitted); Escobar v. 
Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding that “[p]overty, homelessness 
and youth are far too vague and all encompassing to be characteristics that set the 
 
 
3 The determination of whether a proffered particular social group exists is a mixed 
question of law and fact.  S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 542-43.  We exercise plenary review over 
“the ultimate legal question” as to whether a particular social group exists and review for 





perimeters for a protected group”).4  Furthermore, because Paul failed to meet his burden 
for establishing an entitlement to asylum, he also failed to establish the higher burden 
required for withholding of removal.  See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 182 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  
Finally, with regard to his CAT claim, Paul was required to show that “it is more 
likely than not” that he would be tortured “by or at the instigation of or with the consent 
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity,” if he 
were removed.  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1); Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 
F.3d 166, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2002).  “Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman 
treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment that do not amount to torture.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2).  The IJ correctly 
held that Paul’s past experiences in Haiti, including the single occurrence of being the 
victim of a violent robbery with a financial objective, did not amount to torture.  Cf. 
Shardar v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 318, 324 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding that the BIA did not 
err in determining that petitioner, who was “severely beaten” while in police custody, 
was not tortured).  Moreover, the IJ correctly held that Paul failed to establish a 
likelihood that he would be tortured if he returned to Haiti.   
 
4 Paul argues in his brief that the IJ “erred” in relying on Escobar because the IJ in 
Escobar made an adverse credibility determination.  Although this factual distinction is 
correct, it does not help Paul because in Escobar the BIA held that “even if Escobar 
testified credibly, ‘Honduran street children’ did not constitute a ‘particular social group 




Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
holding that this Court affirmed.   
